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From the time the idea of a truth commission was first mooted prior to the 1994 elections,
to the public and parliamentary debates about its character and mandate, and finally
during the course of TRC and amnesty hearings, the need for such a body to deal with the
past has been regarded as absolutely central and undisputed. Indeed, it may be argued that
a crucial measure of the success and efficacy of the TRC process should be the extent to
which it has delivered on its promise to reveal South Africa's hidden and tortuous past.
The truth, it has regularly been declared, should be uncovered in order to heal the wounds
of the past. This exercise is of course profoundly political in so far as its stated goal is to
effect or contribute to national reconciliation, but it was also always much more than that.
Notwithstanding a limited horizon that confined the TRC to investigating only gross
human rights violations between 1960 and 1994, the enterprise has undoubtedly been the
most ambitious historical project ever undertaken in this country. The commission's final
report confirms its central aim to achieve national reconciliation by
establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and
extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed
during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date, including the
antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of such violations, as well
as the perspectives of the victims and the motives and perspectives of the
persons responsible for the commission of the violations, by conducting
investigations and holding hearings.'
There has also been a popular demand for the truth to be uncovered. The prevailing view
has been that the country could only properly proceed on the road to transformation and
national reconciliation once the previously oppressed and oppressor collectively
confronted their past. In particular, the call has been for the oppressors to admit to their
deeds. Ernest Thusini, a religious leader and ANC activist from Durban, in 1987 lost five
of his children in an IFP attack on his KwaMakhuta home. He echoed the feeling of
victims and many black people in 1995 when he insisted that "Without truth, there can be
no reconciliation... There has to be truth and it has to be the real truth... you cannot
escape letting the country know what it needs to know."2 During the TRC hearings the
victims and survivors of violence like Ernest were able to confront the perpetrators of
atrocities who so violently destroyed their lives. And when these perpetrators decided to
disclose the truth, as often happened, the victims and survivors were able to discover why
and how atrocities were committed against family and comrades. Therefore the TRC did
to a certain extent provide a public platform for admissions and revelations of the truth.
The very act of getting the perpetrators of gross human rights violations to admit to their
crimes and sometimes even acknowledge the devastating consequences of their deeds has
arguably been the outstanding success of the TRC.
However, as the TRC's final report declares, the aim was always to expose more than just
the actual perpetrators of gross human rights violations. By committing itself to lifting the
veil on the past, it became incumbent on the TRC to provide explanations of the causes,
circumstances and context within which violations occurred - a responsibility the TRC
endorsed from the outset. It was therefore widely expected that in the course of its
investigations, accumulation of records and documents, collection of oral testimonies as
well as through the evidence provided at hearings, the TRC would be able to make a
substantial contribution to uncovering the past. In fact the pursuit of the truth about the
past became integrally associated with this project of historical rewriting. Ordinary
citizens were therefore not unreasonable in their expectation that the TRC had the moral
authority and obligation to shine a bright light on the past to expose those parts of our
history deliberately hidden and distorted by the apartheid government. The final report
does in fact give an historical account of the period I960 to 1994 that is substantially
different from the official history constructed by the Nationalist government. Merely by
allowing ordinary people publicly to express their views and give personal accounts of
events that were important in their lives, albeit mainly tragic, the TRC has made an
invaluable contribution to uncovering the history of that period. During the three years of
its operation the TRC accumulated mountains of material that now constitute probably
one of the most important and comprehensive archives in the country. The voluminous
final report according to Archbishop Tutu "offers a road map to those who wish to travel
into our past. It is not and cannot be the whole story, but it provides a perspective on the
truth about a past that is more extensive and more complex than any one commission
could ... have captured."3 It is, of course, a particular version of the truth and the past.
Notwithstanding disclaimers, the report is in fact perceived as an authoritative account of
the past, not least of all because its main brief was to uncover the truth about the past.
How useful will the road map bequeathed to us by the TRC be in assisting researchers
and other interested people to navigate the complexities of the past? Unfortunately, the
TRC's final report disappoints in its synthesis of the rich historical material that was at its
disposal. In the main the report lacks a critical and substantive engagement with the
myriad complexities that constituted the 'context' within which violations occurred, as
well as the varied and cumulative causal processes. It opts for sweeping generalisations
and its findings are invariably constructed to fit into the pre-determined categories of
victim and perpetrator. Too often these generalisations are imposed onto local conditions
and consequently tend to ignore the local peculiarities that shaped the form and
determined the content of the various struggles that were waged. Although it could of
course not be expected of the TRC to give a definitive historical account, it nevertheless
falls short of providing a comprehensive treatment of many events and of important
processes.
The TRC's report on the violence that pervaded Kathorus between 1990 - 1994 provides
an example of these shortcomings. As an exercise in truth revelation, the TRC failed in
bringing to light much that was new. The hearings on specific massacres provided
graphic details of atrocities but they said little that was not already known by township
residents, especially the protagonists in the war. Furthermore, the Goldstone Commission
and the Human Rights Commission (HRC) had previously investigated the violence on
the East Rand and had already compiled relatively extensive accounts of some of the
most important massacres. The media had also reported fairly extensively on the
massacres such as the attack on Phola Park, the taxi violence and the train violence in
Katlehong There was therefore already a certain degree of public knowledge about many
of the most notorious instances of violence. However human rights violations in Kathorus
were more extensive and pervasive than either the TRC's hearings or report revealed. On
a daily basis individuals were being abducted, raped, evicted from their homes and killed.
These are the stories that have yet to be disclosed. An investigation into the causes and
effects of these violations would also reveal a far more complex picture of causation than
has been sketched by the TRC. As a project/process of recording history it thereofore
failed to live up to its promises. In fact, the final report of the TRC presents only an
attenuated historical account of events in Kathorus and thus does not contribute
substantially to a new history of the township.
In making these criticisms of the TRC's endeavour to uncover the past, it is necessary
also to acknowledge the many difficulties that it confronted, some of which were beyond
its control while others were self-imposed. The hearings and investigations of the
violence on the East Rand were hamstrung by the refusal of the IFP to participate in the
TRC, which it spuriously claimed was nothing more than an ANC project of revenge
against its political opponents. As a result a crucial voice - that of hostel-dwellers - was
absent from the hearings. Zulu-speaking hostel dwellers were central figures in the
conflict, as perpetrators and victims, and the fact that their stories were not heard has left
a gaping hole in the TRC's report.4 It may be argued that one of the consequences of this
has been to contribute to the TRC's uncritical characterisation of the violence perpetrated
by hostel dwellers almost exclusively as an IFP-inspired power struggle. The IFP's non-
participation also meant that the involvement of the security forces, especially their
collusion with the IFP against township residents, could not be dealt with
comprehensively. The deliberate fabrications and lies often presented by security officers
at hearings and the destruction of tons of records undermined any attempt to find out the
truth about the past, especially in relation to the covert strategies used by the previous
government against the liberation movements. The Commission report on the violence on
the East Rand also criticised the ANC's submission for not being sufficiently
forthcoming about its own activities. However, the ANC was far more candid about its
role in the violence than any other party, and was also willing to accept overall
responsibility for the activities of its members. The Commission was aware of and
concerned about the difficulties it confronted in uncovering the atrocities committed
since 1990. Whereas it "had considerable success in uncovering violations that took place
before 1990. This was not true of the 1990s period. Information before the Commission
shows that the nature and pattern of political conflict in this later period changed
considerably, particularly in its apparent anonymity. A comparatively smaller number of
amnesty applications were received for this period."9
This particular problem was directly related to the difficulties the Commission
experienced "in dealing with the events of the more recent past". The report states that,
"Of 9 043 statements received on killings, over half of these (5 695) occurred during the
1990 to 1994 period. These figures give an indication of violations recorded by the
Commission during the negotiations process. They represent a pattern of violation, rather
than an accurate reflection of levels of violence and human rights abuses. Sources other
than the Commission have reported that, from the start of the negotiations in mid-1990 to
the election in April 1994, some 14 000 South Africans died in politically related
incidents. While Commission figures for reported violations in the earlier part of its
mandate period are under-represented in part because of the passage of time, they are
under-reported in this later period because the abuses are still fresh in people's memories
and closely linked into current distribution of power."6 Clearly people were concerned
about the possible effects revelations about atrocities committed in the more recent past
would have on the current situation. Some township residents were especially worried
that revelations of atrocities could unsettle the fragile peace that had been created in the
post-1994 period.
A further problem faced by the TRC was the heightening tension between uncovering the
truth and achieving reconciliation. Throughout the period of its operation the TRC
insisted on the inseparability of truth and reconciliation. However, while the pursuit for
truth was formally never abandoned, it was often sacrificed at the altar of national
reconciliation as political expediency demanded more circumspect approaches to the
recovery of the past and the truth. This has particularly been the case in relation to the
IFP with whom reconciliation has in fact become more important than revealing the truth
about its pivotal role in atrocities. Thabo Mbeki's suggestion of a blanket amnesty
especially in KwaZulu/Natal therefore seriously jeopardises the fundamental aims and
tenets of the TRC. Similarly, the TRC's awkward handling of spies and informers has
been problematic. The case of Sicelo Dhlomo, the alleged double role of leading ANC
figures and the infiltration of SDUs by police informers suggest that our complex past
was replete with conspiracy, complicity and betrayals. To expose the networks of spies
and informers would of course have opened a veritable can of worms. But it would have
been worthwhile and could have answered many questions that now remain unresolved.
Revealing precisely who was on which side would certainly have shed more light on a
variety of issues, including causes and motives, and would also have illuminated more
clearly who were perpetrators and victims. As a result of the TRC not properly dealing
with this issue, another dark shadow remains cast over our past. Finally it could be
argued that the TRC imposed restrictions on itself by primarily operating within a
framework defined by the dichotomy of perpetrator and victim. It is of course self-
evident that in the execution of atrocities these categories are vitally important and cannot
possibly be excluded. However, as this paper hopes to demonstrate, by according an
overarching centrality to this dichotomy, the TRC report has tended to eschew historical
complexities - of causes and processes - in favour of mono-causality and simplicity. As a
result the contribution that the TRC could potentially have made to the rewriting of the
country's history has not been fulfilled. Instead, the final report has left us with an
attenuated version of the past. This also has important consequences for one of the central
concerns of the TRC, namely, how does one attribute responsibility?
Kathorus Violence
The TRC's report and analysis of the violence on the East Rand is especially deficient
when one considers that the conflict there, and particularly in Kathorus, threatened to
derail the negotiations process. The township complex was at the centre of the Reef war,
which saw approximately IS 000 being killed. The residents of Kathorus (township
residents, squatters and hostel dwellers) throughout the period 1990-94 experienced
extreme disruption. People's lives were dominated by fear of death, many parts of the
townships became no-go areas, schooling was disrupted and very few dared to venture
out at night. So worried were the government and other parties about the potential threat
to the negotiations process posed by the violence in Kathorus that they agreed to declare
the township an unrest area in April 1991. Yet, during the following three years as the
country precariously proceeded to the first democratic elections, Kathorus continuously
teetered on the brink of destruction. In July and August 1993 the war in the Reef
townships was at its worst ever. In those two bloody months 1159 people were killed in
political violence, an average of more than 18 a day. The East Rand was the worst
affected with 310 deaths in August alone.7 In May 1993 hostel inmates from Thokoza
killed 14 ANC supporters who were part of a march to Alberton to present a
memorandum to the authorities. That was on a Saturday. The Monday Inkatha launched a
pre-dawn attack on Katlehong residents, which turned the area into a war zone in which
scores were killed and more 1000 families were forced to seek refuge outside the
townships. A high school student recounted her ordeal:
"I was sleeping in a shack with my brother when all of a sudden we heard
gunshots ringing outside. I realised that something bad must be happening
when I heard a woman screaming and people running past our shack.
When I looked out of the window I saw a group of people wearing red
headbands setting houses on fire and indiscriminately shooting at people.
There were big clouds of smoke outside. I told my brother that it's bad
outside, we are going to be burned inside the shack unless we try to run
away. I can't even remember how I managed to dress. I can only
remember when an AK-47 shot hit me in the stomach. 1 never turned back.
I kept on running... The next thing, I was here in hospital. I don't know
how I came here and I don't know if my brother is still alive."8
A special investigation into the unrest in the area by the Transitional Executive Council
(TEC) in 1993 concluded that Schoeman and Khumalo streets were among the most
dangerous places in the country, "where only the insane will venture".9 The TEC, ANC
and government were so concerned that the unrest in the East Rand, especially Kathorus,
would threaten the first democratic elections that they agreed to deploy 2500 troops in the
region to enforce peace.10 Death and destruction were so common that very few families
remained unscathed. Journalists often compared the situation in Kathorus to the war in
Bosnia. In short, community life was being brutally torn asunder and any hope of peace
seemed very remote. For nearly fours years Kathorus was in the spotlight, resulting in the
accumulation of a huge amount of written material on the conflict. Besides the media
coverage, there were investigations by the HRC, the Goldstone Commission, the TEC
and various NGOs. In our own research on Kathorus we have also found that residents
have been willing to tell their stories. As far as the history of Kathorus between 1990 and
1994 is concerned, therefore, the evidence clearly exists for a more nuanced history to
have been written.
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Context and causes
The TRC's introduction to the report on the violence on the Reef between 1990 and 1994
suggests an awareness of the complexities involved in the conflict. It explains that,
"Although the violence was precipitated and fundamentally shaped by the contest for
political power which took place in the wake of the unbanning of political organisations,
there were a variety of other divisions, including generational, economic, territorial and
personal, that impacted on the form that violence took and motivated people's
participation in it. These conflicts were intensified by the context of poverty and
disempowerment within which they occurred."" After these preliminary remarks
however the report pursues these issues no further. Instead the report tends to reduce the
conflict to the power struggle between the ANC and IFP, and their respective allies. Of
course that power struggle was central. The report correctly explains that the eruption of
violence on the Reef should be viewed in the context of the unbanning of the ANC and
following from that the start of negotiations, which opened the way for the introduction
of black majority rule, led by the ANC. Furthermore, "the escalation of violence
coincided with the establishment of Inkatha as a national political party, the Inkatha
Freedom Party, in July 1990, and its attempts to develop a political base in the
Transvaal."12 Various sectors of society that were linked to the Nationalist government
feared the prospect of the ANC assuming power and were determined to undermine, by
whatever means at its disposal, the mass support enjoyed by the ANC.
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However, part of the problem is that by fusing the complexities of the violence under the
mono-causal rubric of a power struggle between political parties, the important variations
and permutations of that struggle as manifested in the different townships are not
adequately accounted for. For example, how did the fear of ANC dominance express
itself in Kathorus? One the one hand, the 'ANC gevaar" syndrome was deliberately
invoked by the IFP and rightwing organisations to pre-empt the transition to democracy.
On the other hand, it resonated at multiple levels with the actual experiences of hostel
dwellers in the townships. Moreover the conditions under which this occurred were not
created only in the 1990s but were also crucially consequences of accumulated processes
over a period of decades. Trying to make sense of those processes would allow one to
explain why the IFP succeeded in mobilising hostel dwellers so quickly. Why were many
hostel dwellers determined to wage a virtual war against township residents and squatters
for a protracted period? It must be remembered that most Kathorus residents, including
seasoned political activists, were completely surprised by the war that erupted in 1990.
According to township residents the relationship between them and the hostel-dwellers
had been mostly harmonious.13 However, such a description is probably more a
comparison with the extreme violence of the 1990s. It certainly does not provide any
insight into the intricate relationship between the hostels and townships. Again, the TRC
report alludes to some understanding of this dynamic when it explains that "Many hostels
in the Transvaal were inhabited largely by migrant Zulus from rural KwaZulu who had
sought employment in the mines and industries in the Transvaal. Township residents
viewed them as outsiders. The hostel residents used their common ethnic identity as a
means of uniting in a hostile urban environment. These Zulu migrants became a
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springboard for Inkatha's attempt to penetrate the urban Transvaal and launch itself as a
national political force."14 The report the goes on to accuse the IFP of'direct physical
coercion' and comments that "The large dilapidated buildings built to house single males
in large concentrations created the ideal context for coercion and forced recruitment. This
environment also facilitated rapid mobilisation, instant meetings and preparation for
armed attacks."13 It is in this respect that the absence of hostel dwellers from the hearings
is particularly problematic because our knowledge of what happened in the hostels at the
time is very limited. Many questions remain unanswered: How did the coercion happen?
How did hostel residents feel about being forced to join armed gangs? Was there any
resistance? And, very importantly, why did so many hostel dwellers voluntarily join the
fight against squatters and township residents?
Hostel dwellers perceive or imply a complex pattern of causation behind the violence. Up
until the mid 1980s relations between hostel dwellers and township youth are generally
depicted as being cordial. Township residents visited the hostels on weekends for hot
showers, to hawk food and to watch ingomas and other dances. Hostel residents visited
the township for drinks and recreation. A significant number of migrant workers bought
houses in the township, mainly because this permitted easier access to jobs, and
constituted another important bridge between the two communities. In the late seventies
and early eighties many migrant workers from the East Rand metal industries, among
whom Zulu speakers were prominent, joined the Metal and Allied Workers Union
(MAWU) and its successor Numsa. They joined hands in a sequence of industrial actions
alongside fellow union members from the township. They express a universally
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favourable opinion of the union as it protected them from a scourge which affected
migrant workers in particular - unfair or arbitrary dismissal. This bore down on migrants
especially severely as the loss of a job meant repatriation to a rural homeland and often
long-term unemployment.
In the mid 1980s this harmonious pattern of relationships was disturbed. Numsa shop
stewards began 'to fight for people who did not want to work and were dismissed for
valid reasons such as absenteeism and drunkenness.' A new generation of shop stewards
in the factories were also perceived as organising frivolous strikes, venting a near
universal view among Zulu migrants that this and Cosatu's disinvestment campaigns
were causing East Rand factories to close down. This growing disenchantment among
Zulu migrants in particular was compounded by repeated stay-aways. The sole reason for
migrant workers travelling to the Rand was to work and earn money. Stay-aways called
in the late eighties about which Zulu migrants were not consulted produced a growing
estrangement between migrants and their unions, migrants and township residents and
migrants and township youth. The fact that the youth were mainly responsible for
mobilising support, often through coercion, for stayaways exacerbated the perception that
township youth were undisciplined, lazy and did not respect their elders. Increasingly
hostel migrants believed their interests diverged substantially from that of township
residents. As one Vosloorus migrant put it, "The Zulu said they had come to the Rand for
the sole purpose of working. They left their families behind them. They [now] had to
down tools to stay in the hostel, while the township people downed tools to stay with
their families."16 From the mid-eighties therefore a growing estrangement and even
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antagonism developed between hostel-dwellers and township residents, that was largely
independent of political mobilisation by the IFP, but which contributed significantly to its
ability to do so in the early 1990s.
It is important also to understand how the violence started in the townships because the
differences that emerge in this respect point to varying local causes. In the case of the
former the first major attack by hostel-dwellers was against Phola Park squatter camp. In
Katlehong the first conflict first reared its head as a struggle between opposing taxi
associations. Further investigation of these issues in fact reveal a more complex set of
causes that involve struggles over resources, deteriorating conditions in hostels,
antagonism between hostel-dwellers and township youth, fears of domination and the
often insidious role of the security forces and officials from the township and town
councils. The TRC description of the violence also tends to suggest a significant degree
of commonality between the townships, without attempting to prove it. In fact, it rarely
attempts to explain the peculiarities of the conflict in each of the townships. Some
analysis of these differences would further highlight the myriad influences on the
conflict. All three townships were racked by the violence, but Thokoza and Katlehong
were particularly badly affected. The Kwesine and Mshayazafe IFP-controlled hostels in
Katlehong and Thokoza respectively, were centres of the conflict. So too were the large
ANC-dominated squatter camps such as Mandela camp and Phola Park. The conflict
between the hostels and squatter camps was the most violent. Often the conflict
originated between these communities and then spread to the townships. The violence in
Vosloorus was less protracted, but equally brutal. The violence in Vosloorus reached a
bloody peak in November 1990 when 54 people were killed in just one hour of fighting
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that occurred when the township's power was cut by the Boksburg council suggesting
also complicity by the white local authority, on which the Conservative Party was
prominently represented.17 It seems that a combination of diplomacy by the Vosloorus
Civic Association18 and early military defeats inflicted on the hostels by township
residents19 prevented the conflict from spiraling out of control in that township.
Interestingly, the resolution of the taxi conflict in Vosloorus contributed hugely to the
ending of the broader struggle in that township.
Squatters vs hostels
An important feature of the conflict that is underplayed by the TRC report is the
antagonism between squatter settlements and hostel dwellers. In Thokoza and Katlehong
this particular struggle was always central, whereas in Vosloorus the absence of squatter
settlements contributed to a less protracted struggle. An important area of tension
between the authorities and community in Kathorus was over the future of squatter
settlements. The inability of the councils to provide housing and the continued influx of
people from the rural areas resulted by the end of the eighties in the emergence of huge
squatter populations in Katlehong and Thokoza, which were among the highest in the
PWV, whereas Vosloorus did not experience any major squatter development.20
Katlehong was especially affected because its close proximity to the industrial areas of
Germiston and Johannesburg made it the preferred destination for thousands of
impoverished rural dwellers in search of work. The continued forced removals from
Dukatole further added to the township's population growth, and finally, hostel dwellers
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were increasingly also encouraging their families to move to the urban areas. However,
the vast majority of squatters came from impoverished rural areas, especially from the
Ciskei and Transkei. This fed into the perception that the urban townships were being
dominated by Xhosa-speakers. Between 1980 and 1982 the number of backyard shacks in
Katlehong grew fourfold from eight to thirty four thousand.21 The Council in 1981
estimated that there were 21 000 shacks compared to only 17 000 houses in the township.
This occurred despite the Council's determination to prevent the erection of shacks. In
Thokoza in 1982 there were twice the number of shacks than houses, namely, 35 000
compared to I76S0. By 1991 the number of shacks in Katlehong and Thokoza was 81
000 and 65 000 respectively.22 From the late seventies, therefore, the proportion of
hostel-dwellers in the townships had dwindled very substantially. Furthermore, squatter
settlements sometimes developed very close to the hostels. Residents from the squatter
camps and township often provide as evidence of the harmonious relationship between
themselves and hostel dwellers the fact that they were permitted regularly to utilise the
bathing facilities in the hostel.23 However, hostel dwellers did not always see this in the
same light. For example, the Thokoza Hostel Dwellers Association complained to the
Council that squatters were entering the hostel at all hours to use these facilities and
alleged that they were stealing the belongings of hostel dwellers.24
The Mandela and Holomisa camps in Katlehong and Phola Park in Thokoza were
constantly threatened by forced removals and were regularly subjected to raids by
security forces, resulting in open clashes and the destruction of people's shacks. Besides
having to live under the most abject conditions, squatters therefore also had to deal with
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the threat of removal. As a result these camps became highly politicised and were
strongholds of the anti-apartheid struggle. The intensifying conflict between squatters and
the authorities became an important factor in the violence in Kathorus, as is revealed in
the example of Phola Park. The mayhem in Thokoza started in August 1990 when hostel
dwellers launched an offensive against Phola Park squatters. By all accounts the attack
was planned and executed with almost military precision as scores of heavily armed
hostel-dwellers descended without warning on Phola Park. The attack was brutal,
indiscriminate and aimed to wreak maximum havoc in the squatter camp. Phola Park's
residents were caught completely by surprise and were unable effectively to defend
themselves. Although groups of residents quickly mobilised rudimentary defences and
retaliated with an assortment of make-shift weapons, they were unable to prevent the
massacre. Besides numerous deaths and injuries, many people also fled the area and
sought refuge in the township. The attack on Phola Park has often been explained as a
revenge attack by hostel dwellers after one of their colleagues was killed during a
gambling game in the squatter camp.23 According to this account a Xhosa-speaking
squatter killed a Zulu-speaking hostel inmate after an argument either over gambling or a
woman. The attack by hostel dwellers was thus seen as a revenge attack. A series of
retaliatory attacks from both sides over the next few days resulted in the death of more
than 140 people, one of the highest death tolls for any period anywhere in the country."
The fighting between squatters and hostel dwellers almost immediately was politicised.
Squatters viewed the hostel dwellers and the IFP as allies of the authorities, anli-ANC
and anti-Xhosa. They saw the attacks on the settlement as part of a strategy forcibly to
remove them from the areas. From the time Phola Park was established in 1987 the
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Thokoza Council tried desperately to remove the squatters to Zonkezizwe, a camp much
further away from the township. In 1989 Council used the police to destroy shacks and
evict people from the camp. However, the squatters resisted, fought with the police and
eventually won a Supreme Court case preventing the council from removing them. The
struggle by the squatters was also seen as integral to the defiance campaign of the Mass
Democratic Movement. They therefore received strong support from the Congress
organisations in Thokoza. The political antagonism between the squatters and the
authorities explains why Phola Park became a key target of the assault against ANC-
aligned residents.
Taxis, migrants and youth
The spatial segmentation of community and working life imposed by apartheid was also
instrumental in generating other frictions and conflicts. The huge distances separating
migrant workers from their homelands, and the lesser but still substantial ones separating
African townships from their sources of employment made transport a prime site of
contestation. Once mini-buses became a common feature in South Africa, it is not
surprising that taxi routes between the cities and the homelands were among the first
established, and that taxi associations based on these routes were among the first formed,
and the most formidable. In Katlehong the first major taxi association to come in to being
was GMB, organised by Zulu migrants from Nqutu. Two years afterwards there emerged
a township based taxi association entitled Kato which began to compete increasingly
fiercely with GMB over the main taxi routes. Zulu migrants saw this competition
19
between GMB and Kato as the first trigger of violence. They claim that taxi owners
within Kato incited their children to attack GMB taxis. The conflict came to a head when
Zulu migrants refused to observe a stayaway in 1989. At that point the interests of the
Katlehong taxi owners and the politicised youth coalesced. Youth attacked and burnt a
taxi owned by a Mr. Ngobese of GMB after it had left the Kwesine hostel. Migrants
claim a number of people were killed, including a pregnant woman and a child. Migrants
from the hostel then retaliated by attacking the township killing a large number of people.
Thereafter negotiations took place and peace was restored.
The second phase of the conflict in the now universal opinion of Zulu migrants was an
ethnic was war between Zulus and Xhosas. The backdrop to this war, at least partly, was
the spatial disassembling of apartheid. Following the abolition of influx control, huge
numbers of people, hitherto penned into the reserves, flooded into the Witwatersrand in
search of employment. Xhosa workers and their families figured especially prominently
in this influx. This created new sources of competition, new tensions and new frictions
between groups that had not been closely juxtaposed before. A new flashpoint of conflict
emerged some time in 1990. Up until that point migrants from all ethnic groups occupied
hostels, and in the taxi violence of mid-1989 they are supposed to have presented a united
front. After the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 a new spirit of ethnic chauvinism was
born, which greatly exacerbated existing tensions. A meeting at Kwesine hostel was
called quite possibly by the IFP and at which inflammatory speeches were made asserting
that the Zulus were not going to be ruled by the Xhosa. In the aftermath of this the Xhosa
20
residents of the hostel were told to leave, who then evacuated themselves and their
possessions to the squatter camp.
At some stage in the same period a rumour came into circulation that the Zulu staying in
Lindela hostel were about to be attacked by Xhosa and Bhaca from Khutlala hostel. Some
Zulu migrants took note of the warning and left -others did not, and were killed.
Henceforth a process of ethnic cleansing developed both in hostels across the East Rand
and in squatter camps like Phola Park. As Xhosa groups by and large aligned themselves
with the ANC and the township residents did the same, the conflict entered the third
phase identified by Zulu migrant as a political war between the IFP and ANC. In this a
total polarisation of the East Rand had occurred, in which both police and informers
played an active role in fomenting the violence. Zulu speakers in the townships were now
perceived as potential spies unless they enthusiastically supported ANC campaigns.
Migrants who had bought houses in the township were forced to flee to the hostels, Zulu
women fled to take up residence in the hostels in large numbers - a hitherto
unprecedented development. The most cold-blooded and violent acts of barbarism were
perpetrated on both sides.
Tensions between opposing taxi associations simmered throughout this period. In March
1990 a new wave of bloody conflict erupted with a full scale taxi war between the
Katlehong Taxi Organisation (Kato) and the Germiston District Taxi Association
(GDTA). The conflict was initially over taxi routes but very soon became politicised.
Most GDTA members were Zulu-speaking and were not popular among youth activist,
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whereas Kato won the approval of the youth, partly because they offered students
discounts. As a result the GDTA targeted Cosas members and killed five students in one
attack. Hostel dwellers aligned themselves to the GDTA apparently after youth attacked a
taxi with migrant workers. The intense conflict that ensued between the two taxi
associations and their supporters resulted in the death of fifty people in one month.
Attempts by community organisations to intervene initially proved fruitless. The
Katlehong Civic and the local Crisis Committee called a mass meeting that was attended
by more than 10 000 residents where it was decided to boycott taxis until the dispute was
resolved.27 After a month of warfare a UDF task force convened a meeting between the
associations in an attempt to resolve the conflict. Only after both associations accepted
responsibility, for and agreed to end the conflict, was it decided to call off the boycott and
permit the taxis to operate again.28
Taxi drivers from all three Kathorus townships claimed that they were forced to take
sides in the war between the ANC and IFP. As was the case in Katlehong, many taxi
drivers either lived in the hostels or had strong links to migrants living in the hostels. This
was due in part to the fact that migrant workers were regular long distance commuters.
Many of these taxis operated from the hostel, transporting inmates to and from work.
Township residents also made use of this service and this was usually regarded as quite
normal. However, during the taxi struggles residents were forced to identify safe taxis as
it was reported that Inkatha-aligned drivers were taking commuters into the hostels where
they were assaulted and killed.29 Cynthia Ncala, her mother and cousin were taken
hostage after boarding a taxi in Germiston. They were taken to the Kwesine hostel where
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they were forced to strip and drink petrol, after which Inkatha members took shots at their
stomachs to ignite them so that they could explode.30 The patterns of violence directed
against women also requires further attention. Thokoza experienced a particular violent
episode of taxi violence in September 1993 when nearly fifty people were killed. In
Vosloorus hostel dwellers, especially Zulu-speakers, controlled large parts of the taxi
industry and they resolutely refused to allow other taxis to operate in the township. This
meant that Vosloorus residents who were more dependent on taxis because of the absence
of a railway line, had to walk long distances to get to the taxi ranks, which were located
close to the hostels. When new taxi owners started operating from within the township
they won the support of the community but gained the extreme ire of the hostel taxi
drivers. The conflict between the two taxi groups immediately assumed the character of
an 1FP vs ANC dispute. Oupa Simelane, a Vosloorus taxi driver, was ambushed by
AK47-wielding hostel dwellers because he refused to obey their order that taxis in the
area should operate from Somhlolo, a taxi rank next to the hostel. Although the driver
survived the attack, six of his passengers were killed. Simelane opposed the Inkatha
instruction because it meant township residents would have to walk a few kilometers
before being able to get a taxi.31 The intervention by the Vosloorus Civic Association
eventually succeeded in thrashing out a compromise agreement on taxi routes.32
The above examples have been highlighted to illustrate that the history of the conflict in
Kathorus in the early nineties was considerably more complex than is suggested by the
TRC report. At one level it might be easy to define the conflict as one between the ANC
and IFP, and that was probably its main feature. However, the TRC's characterisation of
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the conflict as a power struggle does not take account of the myriad issues that impacted
on the conflict and, in particular localities determined the precise nature of the conflict.
Later this year the TRC will publish its report in a popular format, which will be more
widely available than the original report. Therefore, its version of the truth and the past
will probably become more influential in shaping public perceptions of our history. It is
for this reason, perhaps more than any other, that a critical evaluation of the TRC's
contribution to writing the country's history is absolutely essential.
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